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I. INTRODUCTION
Naval Mine warfare is an area of military expertise that has
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truly come into its own this century.1 Military planners herald the
naval mine as an extremely effective, yet unglamorous -option in
the national weapons arsenal. A silent, passive, and pernicious
weapon, the naval mine, with its multiplier effect, has influenced
the strategic outcomes of conflict this century. 2 It is described as
both an "immoral weapon" 3 and one that is an "inseparable
element of naval power." 4 Significantly, the recent international
efforts to ban landmines have not included naval mines.
Accordingly, it is timely to consider the rules regulating the
deployment of naval mines because these weapons remain a very
important aspect of the catalogue of weapons available to most
States.
Given the recognized significance of the use of the naval
mine, it is somewhat curious that the only specific treaty
attempting to regulate this area of warfare is the Convention
(VIII) of 1907 Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine
Mines (Hague Convention). 5 The Hague Convention is regarded
as a poor compromise, and is variously described as an
"emasculated" and "worthless" 6 treaty that was the product of
diametrically opposed views of the participants to the Second
Hague Peace Conference. 7 The history of the negotiations leading
to the Hague Convention reflect the acknowledged value of the
weapon itself. After the turn of the century, the naval mine was
recognized as a relatively cheap weapon that directly threatened
the naval superiority of established powers. This truism continues
to apply today, and was particularly evident during the recent
naval operations in the Persian Gulf.
8
1. See Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., Submarine Mines in International Law, in THE LAW
OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 351 (Int'l Law Studies, vol. 64, Horace B. Robertson, Jr. ed.,
1991).
2. See generally Ernest Fortin, Those Damn Mines, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC., July
1992, at 30.
3. Alan Hinge, Australia's Use of the Seamine in the 1990s, 10 J. AUSTL. NAVAL
INST. 47,47 (1984).
4. John F. Tarpey, A Minestruck Navy Forgets Its History, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC.,
Feb. 1988, at 44,46.
5. Convention (VIII) Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact
Mines, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 U.S.T. 541 [hereinafter Hague Convention VIII].
6. See HOWARD S. LEVIE, MINE WARFARE AT SEA 53 (1992).
7. See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 3 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guerlff
eds., 2d ed. 1989).
8. See generally J. M. Martin, We Still Haven't Learned, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC.,
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Notwithstanding the criticism surrounding the Hague
Convention, its substantive provisions consistently impact the
planning of naval operations. The first part of this Article briefly
outlines the military background leading to the Hague
Convention's drafting, and analyzes the Convention's substantive
provisions. These provisions, while greatly influenced by the
political compromises of the Second Hague Peace Conference,
disclose certain universal principles that continue to apply to the
regulation of this area of naval warfare. This Article
demonstrates, however, that the technical development of naval
mines throughout this century far exceeds what the Hague
Convention's drafters initially contemplated.
Given these technical developments, in conjunction with this
century's profound changes to the legal regulation of conflict, a
residual question remains concerning the Hague Convention's
application to contemporary military/naval operations. The
Convention is premised on the existence of a state-of-war, as a
legal concept. As a result of legal developments this century,
however, not least of which was the emergence of the United
Nations Charter system, this premise has been abolished.
Part II of this Article examines the Hague Convention's
application within a contemporary legal framework. The
Convention continues to affect the regulation of naval mine
warfare and the planning of contemporary operations, both within
times of armed conflict and otherwise. This Article demonstrates
that the principles underpinning the Hague Convention are
recognized by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which has
accorded substantive effect to these principles. Indeed, the Court
has made some insightful conclusions as to the nature of the
Convention's underlying legal principles. Specifically, the Court
concluded that principles of "humanity" serve to impose
obligations on States that employ and encounter naval mines,
notwithstanding the absence of a de jure application of the Hague
Convention itself.9 This Article analyzes the implications of the
ICJ decisions and their relation to customary international law.
July 1991, at 64.
9. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Dec. 5) [hereinafter Corfu
Channel].
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The final part of this Article focuses specifically on the
current state of customary international law regulating naval mine
warfare. The analysis relies heavily on the recent conclusions
reached by a panel of international scholars, which are reproduced
in the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to
Armed Conflicts at Sea (San Remo Manual).10 This publication
was authored by a group of distinguished naval operators and legal
experts who sought to codify the disparate elements of the laws of
naval warfare, including, in particular, the issue of naval mine
warfare. This Article contends that, in addition to the laws
deriving from the Hague Convention, the emergence of general
principles of the jus in bello,11 as manifested in the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols, also significantly
affects the manner in which naval mine warfare is undertaken.
This Article concludes that, far from being a worthless failure,
the Hague Convention provides a substantial and lingering
influence on the laws regulating naval mine warfare. Judicial
recognition of the Convention's underlying principles has merged
with the Convention's relative paucity of substantive regulation.
Recognizing the terribly effective impact of naval mines, such
principles relate to the protection of innocent shipping. Consistent
with these principles, States are absolutely obligated to control
these weapons, that generally cannot distinguish between lawful
and unlawful targets.
12
10. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA (Louise Doswald-
Beck ed., 1995) [hereinafter SAN REMO MANUAL].
11. The term, "jus in bello," also termed, "jus belli," means: "The law of war [or
armed conflict]. The law of nations as applied to a state of war [or armed conflict],
defining in particular the rights and duties of the belligerent powers themselves, and of
neutral nations. That which may be done without injustice with regard to an enemy."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 771 (5th ed. 1979). This term is distinguishable from the
term, "Jus ad bellum," also termed, "jus bellum dicendi," which means: "The right of
proclaiming war [or armed conflict]." Id.
12. See generally Clingan, supra note 1, at 354.
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL MINE WARFARE AND THE
SUBSTANTIVE TERMS OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION
A. Background to the Hague Convention
During the American Civil War (1860-1865), the use of naval
mines demonstrated the weapon's early effectiveness in addressing
the naval superiority of an adversary in modern conflict. Termed
"torpedoes" at the time, Confederate forces inflicted greater
damage on Union naval forces with the use of these weapons
instead of gunfire. 13 Indeed, the American Civil War was the
occasion for Admiral Farragut's famous and frequently quoted
line, "Damn the torpedoes, Captain Drayton, go ahead."'14
It was in the course of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905),
however, that the unrestricted use of naval mines reached its
apogee. During that conflict, both forces laid thousands of mines,
principally around the Eastern Russian ports, Vladivostok and
Port Arthur. 15 In all, the use of naval mines was extremely
effective as a direct weapon of warfare accounting for "[two]
battleships, [four] cruisers, [three] destroyers and a minelayer from
the Japanese Fleet and one battleship, one cruiser, [two]
destroyers and [two] gunboats from the Russian Fleet. ' 16 More
significantly, the strategic value of mine-laying was realized during
this conflict. Naval mines were recognized as effective weapons,
particularly in their ability to deny an adversary's access to sea
lanes. The very unrestricted use of naval mines in this conflict,
however, was the impetus for developing some form of regulation.
For a prolonged period of time following that conflict, the "coasts
of Japan, China and Russia were polluted by mines that had
broken adrift or had been laid and not swept."'1 7 This pollution
caused considerable danger to commercial maritime activity and
resulted in the tragic loss of lives. The following statement by the
Chinese Government accurately summarized the alarming need to
13. Confederate mines sank twenty-seven Union ships; in comparison, gunfire only
sank nine ships. See LEVIE, supra note 6, at 13.
14. Fortin, supra note 2, at 30.
15. See generally, Clingan, supra note 1, at 351.
16. R. H. Crane, Mine Warfare - History and Development, 10 J. AUSTL. NAVAL
INST. 31, 37 (1984).
17. Id.
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regulate naval mine warfare:
The Chinese Government is even today under the necessity of
equipping the vessels in its coastwide trade with special
instruments to pick up and destroy the floating mines which
encumber not only the high sea but also its territorial waters. In
spite of every precaution being taken, a very considerable
number of coasting trade boats, fishing boats, junks and
sampans have sunk as a consequence of collisions with these
automatic submarine contact mines, and these vessels have
been utterly lost with their cargoes without the details of the
disasters reaching the western world. It is calculated that from
five to six hundred of our countrymen in pursuit of their
peaceful occupations have met a cruel death through these
dangerous engines.
18
These problems, which led to the drafting of the Hague
Convention, disclose the irreconcilable differences 19 between the
dominant naval powers, such as Great Britain, and the emerging
naval powers, such as Germany. Notwithstanding the obvious
humanitarian impulse to protect the safety of vessels from third-
party States, Germany was not inclined to squander, through legal
regulation, the naval mine's tactical and strategic usefulness. Like
Germany, Britain's motivation to regulate the use of mines was
not altruistic. Britain recognized that the naval mine more than
adequately redressed superior naval dominance and acted as a
force-leveler. In its zealous efforts to "outlaw" naval mines,
Britain was motivated by its desire to retain naval dominance.
Indeed, as author Daniel Patrick O'Connell wrote, "the
Convention embodies a compromise between the British policy in
1907 of opposing the use of unanchored mines and minefields laid
for the purpose of economic blockade and the German policy of
using mines for the purpose of hampering pursuit and instituting
such a blockade."
20
The compromised language that was ultimately incorporated
in the Hague Convention reflects the conflicting motivations of
Great Britain and Germany. It is ironic, therefore, that the
18. LEVIE, supra note 6, at 29.
19. See id. at 25.
20. 2 DANIEL PATRICK O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 1138 (Ivan
Anthony Shearer ed. 1984).
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humanitarian motivations, as reflected in the Chinese
Government's statements, have become, from a legal perspective,
the Hague Convention's dominant and lingering legacy.
B. The Substantive Provisions of the Hague Convention
Although the Hague Convention is comprised of thirteen
Articles, only Articles 1 through 5 address the regulation of naval
mine warfare. This Article's analysis of the Convention is
therefore limited to these provisions. Article 1 of the Hague
Convention states that it is forbidden:
(a) to lay unanchored automatic contact mines, except when
they are so constructed as to become harmless one hour at most
after the person who laid them ceases to control them; (b) to lay
anchored automatic contact mines which do not become
harmless as soon as they have broken loose from their
moorings; [or] (c) to use torpedoes which do not become
harmless when they have missed their mark.21
The subject matter of Article 1 is the "automatic contact
mine," which was, at the time, one of only two types of naval mine
in operation. The other, the "Colt's mine," was activated by an
electric cable, and thus was susceptible to manual control. The
"automatic contact mine," however, was activated by the mine's
physical contact with the intended target. The purpose of Article 1
is to ameliorate the deadly and non-discriminatory effects of
"automatic contact mines" once they escape "control." The
Article reflects the currently understood "principle of distinction,"
which states that a distinction must be drawn between legitimate
military objectives and civilian objects and the civilian population
when conducting military/naval operations, and permitting only
military objectives to be the subject of attack.22  While this
principle is now expressly contained within Article 48 of
Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Geneva
21. Hague Convention VIII, art. 1.
22. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), June
8, 1977, art. 48, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol I] (discussing the distinction
between "military objectives" and "civilian objects," which the author of the Article refers
to as the "principle of distinction").
1999]
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Protocol 1),23 it was something of a novelty at the time of the
Second Hague Peace Conference. The purpose of Article 48, in its
protection of neutral shipping (and indeed even that of the
belligerents' 24 own vessels), was premised on the concept of
mutual interest.25 The destruction of innocent neutral shipping
afforded no military advantage to belligerents. Moreover, the
effects of the drifting, uncontrolled naval mines following the
Russo-Japanese War was still a very pressing topic of concern.
The application of Article 1 to modern warfare remains
slightly contentious. Technology has far surpassed the two
variants of naval mine available at the time of the Convention's
drafting. A large variety of "influence" mines now exist that are
not activated by direct contact, but may be activated by a number
of other factors, including pressure, acoustics, magnetic and other
influence triggers.26 A description of the types of naval mines now
available is limited only by the imagination of the designers as to
the types of triggering mechanisms that might be employed. 27
Hence, current types of naval mines include: aerial bombs, which
have had their triggering mechanisms replaced with mine sensors;
buoyant rockets, which are tethered to sinkers; homing torpedoes,
which are activated upon receipt of suitable target signatures; non-
homing torpedoes, which are submarine-launched and rest on the
sea floor; and missiles, which are released from underwater
"cocoons" upon receipt of suitable target signals.28  As a
consequence of these variants, a workable generic definition of the
term "naval mine" is any "underwater explosive device that waits
23. Id.
24. The term, "belligerent," as used herein, "designates either of two nations [that]
are actually in a state of war with each other, as well as their allies actively [cooperating],
as distinguished from a nation [that] takes no part in the war and maintains a strict
indifference as between the contending parties, called a 'neutral."' BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 141.
25. See id. ("In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population
and civilian objects .... ).
26. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF NAVY, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (NWP 1-14M) 9-2, para. 9.2.1 (1995) [hereinafter
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK].
27. See generally Hector J. Donahue, Minesweeping + Mine Hunting = Success, U.S.
NAVAL INST. PROC., March 1998, at 52.
28. See Mike Turner, Several Aspects of Sea Mines, 10 J. AUSTL. NAVAL INST. 59, 59
(1984).
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to sink or damage targets or deter them from entering an area."29
Given the broad definition of the term "naval mine," the issue
remains as to whether the purview of Article 1 encompasses
modem naval mines. If it does not, the Article is otiose. The
reasoning that supports the proposition that the Article does not
have this reach partially relies on an invocation of the expressio
unius est exclusio alterius maxim of interpretation. 30  Such
reasoning, however, plainly defeats the purpose of the Article and
must be considered fanciful and inconsistent with State practice.
Certainly, the better view,31 proffers that Article 1 applies to
current naval mine types. This reasoning allowed the Second
Hague Peace Conference to be concerned, not with the
discriminatory status of automatic contact mines themselves, but
rather, with the indiscriminate way in which such mines could be
used.32 Moreover, such an interpretation is consistent with the
general requirement that States refrain from acts that would defeat
the object and purpose of a treaty.
33
Article 2 states that it is forbidden "to lay automatic contact
mines off the coast and ports of the enemy, with the sole object of
interrupting commercial shipping." 34 In the course of the debates
leading to the adoption of Article 2, Britain initially proposed a
more comprehensive provision that outlawed the use of naval
mines to establish or enforce commercial blockades. 35 Such a
proposal would ensure that Britain, with its naval dominance,
29. Alan Hinge, Mine Warfare and Mine Countermeasures, in OPERATIONAL AND
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN MARITIME WARFARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
WESTERN PACIFIC 63 (Dick Sherwood ed., 1994).
30. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a "maxim of statutory interpretation
meaning that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 521.
31. See A. G. Y. Thorpe, Mine Warfare at Sea -Some Legal Aspects for the Future, 18
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 255, 259 (1987) (referring to the view advanced by Professor
O'Connell that "general considerations tend towards extending the principles of the
Hague Convention to cover all types of mine, whether or not moored .... ).
32. See NETHERLANDS MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, G.J.F. VAN HEGELSOM, METHODS
AND MEANS OF COMBAT IN NAVAL WARFARE 18-19 (1988) (Introductory Report to the
Madrid Programme of Work by the Netherlands Ministry of Defense) (unpublished
report, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law
Journal).
33. See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 8,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
34, Hague Convention VIII, art. 2.
35. See LEVIE, supra note 6, at 32.
1999]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
would enjoy an advantage in satisfying the criterion of ensuring a
blockade was "effective," as required under classic prescriptions,
and thus maximizing the legal rights that subsequently accrued.
This proposition was not accepted, and thus the effectiveness of
the Article, with its "sole object" test, effectively rendered the
operative provisions of Article 2 redundant. 36  Indeed, this
addition of the "sole object" test has been described as the
"yawning loophole" 37 that does not require great ingenuity to
circumvent.
Article 2, in its literal terms, is also somewhat anachronistic in
its generic reference to "commercial shipping" and assumption
that all non-military shipping is therefore immune from attack.
The customary law of naval warfare now permits the targeting of
neutral commercial shipping in circumstances where such shipping
makes an effective contribution to the enemy's military action.38
With its reference to mines "off the coast," Article 2 has some
continuing application to the geographic limitations on the
placement of naval mines. It is the only Article in the Hague
Convention that makes such geographic references and it suggests
that a degree of proximity is necessary to justify the laying of
mines. As outlined below, issues regarding naval mines in
international waters are relevant in contemporary debates. Article
3 states that:
When anchored contact mines are employed, every possible
precaution must be taken for the security of peaceful shipping.
The belligerents undertake to do their utmost to render these
mines harmless within a limited time, and, should they cease to
be under surveillance, to notify the danger zones as soon as
military exigencies permit, by a notice addressed to ship
owners, which must also be communicated to the governments
through the diplomatic channel.39
36. See Hague Convention VIII, art. 2.
37. Clingan, supra note 1, at 354.
38. See generally W. J. Fenrick, Military Objectives in the Law of Naval Warfare 58-
62 (1988) (unpublished Report to the Madrid Programme of Work, on file with author).
See also COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 7-6, para. 7.5.1 ("neutral merchant
vessels.., acquire enemy character and may be treated by a belligerent as enemy warships
... when ... acting in any capacity as a naval or military auxiliary to the enemy's forces.").
39. Hague Convention VIII, art 3.
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A significant aspect of Article 3 is its reference to "peaceful
shipping." 40  The emphasis here accords with contemporary
developments in the law of naval warfare, in that neutral vessels
not engaged in belligerent activity are accorded immunity from
attack or capture. Notwithstanding this deference to peaceful
shipping, Article 3's apparent obligation to "render these mines
harmless within a limited time.. ."41 is curious. If a "limited time"
is not equated with the cessation of hostilities, then such a
proposition is not consistent with subsequent State practice,
particularly U.S. actions during the Vietnam conflict.42 Thus, this
provision has been overtaken by developments in State practice.
The provision also misconceives the significant role that the
minefields play in denying access to sea lanes. A naval minefield
has "completely succeeded in its mission if the opponent refuses to
challenge it .... ,,43 In this regard, the requirement to provide
"notice," as the provision mandates, readily serves strategic
purposes in its own right. Indeed, the emphasis on proper
notification of minefields, which are otherwise under control, has
become a preeminent legal obligation, as recognized by the ICJ
and reflected in contemporary customary law.
44
Notwithstanding the recognition of early principles of notice
in Article 3, the caveat that some of these obligations are
dependent on "military exigencies," necessarily undermines the
efficacy of the provision. Such an emphasis is not permissible
today under the contemporary jus in bello.45 The concept of
"military necessity" is now only one element of the
"proportionality" equation mandated by Articles 51 and 57 of the
Geneva Protocol 1.46 As such, the terms of Article 3 and the
qualification on the obligation concerning "military exigencies" is
now completely spent. Article 4 provides:
40. 111
41. Id.
42. See generally, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 10, at 172 n.138.
43. ALAN HINGE, MINE WARFARE IN AUSTRALIA'S FIRST LINE OF DEFENCE 9
(Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 86, 1992).
44. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 10, at 172 (noting that the notion has
"evolved into a customary law obligation.").
45. For an explanation of the term, "jus in bello," see supra note 11.
46. Geneva Protocol I, art. 51, para. 5(b), art. 57 (this concept also constitutes an
independent principle of customary international law).
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Neutral Powers which lay automatic contact mines off their
coasts must observe the same rules and take the same
precautions as are imposed on belligerents. The neutral Power
must inform ship owners, by notice issued in advance, where
automatic contact mines have been laid. This notice must be
communicated at once to the Governments through the
diplomatic channel.
47
Article 4, while ostensibly repeating the terms of Article 3, is
significant in its recognition of neutral States' rights to deny
adversaries' access to sea lanes. While classic legal prescription
requires that such rights be forcibly protected,48 it is relevantly
acknowledged that neutral security interests may deny access to
sea lanes "off their coasts" (i.e., within their territorial
seas/archipelagic waters).49 This presumably applies not just to
belligerents, but also to other third parties. Such security rights
today, however, may be enforced only in accordance with Article
25 of the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (COLS),
50
which permits a coastal State to suspend even innocent passage in
a non-discriminatory basis where such suspension is essential for
the protection of its security. Article 5 states:
At the close of the war, the contracting Powers undertake to do
their utmost to remove the mines which they have laid, each
Power removing its own mines. As regards [sic] anchored
automatic contact mines laid by one of the belligerents off the
coast of the other, their position must be notified to the other
party by the Power which laid them, and each Power must
proceed with the least possible delay to remove the mines in its
own waters.
51
47. Hague Convention VIII, art 4.
48. See DEPARTMENT OF THE U.S. NAVY, ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS NWP 9 (Rev. A) 7-3
(Annot. Supp. 1989); see generally also Convention (XIII) Concerning the Rights and
Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 26 (Article 26 states, "The
exercise by a neutral Power of the rights laid down in the present Convention can under
no circumstances be considered as an unfriendly act by one or other belligerent who has
accepted the articles relating thereto.").
49. Hague Convention VIII, art 4.
50. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/122
[hereinafter Convention on the Law of the Sea].
51. Hague Convention VIII, art 5.
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Despite the internal inconsistencies relating to the principal
responsibility for the removal of mines,52 the import of Article 5 is
clear. Article 5 recognizes this passive weapon system's continuing
danger and, consequently, it directly imposes an ongoing
obligation on the parties to a conflict to remove naval mines at the
cessation of hostilities. Article 5 is also significant in its implicit
recognition of the extent of belligerent rights created. While a
state-of-war allows for the legitimate deployment of mines, the
ending of such a state-of-war imposes quite exacting obligations
concerning the removal of naval mines. Thus, by implication,
"war" seems to be the authority for the deployment of mines. As
discussed, current prescriptions would allow for the use of naval
mines notwithstanding the absence of a state-of-war. This has
resulted, however, in the emergence of particularly acute
commensurate obligations concerning the control of such mines.
C. The Character of the Hague Convention
As qualified and diffuse as it is, the Hague Convention
remains a significant influence in the regulation of naval warfare.
While necessarily a product of significant compromise, the
Convention was somewhat prophetic in its early recognition of the
need to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants and
its imposition of ongoing obligations on belligerent parties to
better protect peaceful shipping and secure freedom of navigation.
More particularly, the Convention remains an early testament to
the now universally accepted principle that the rights of the parties
to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare are
not unlimited.53 As outlined in the following two parts of this
Article, the Convention, or more particularly the humanitarian
impulses that ostensibly underpin its provisions, are heralded by
the ICJ. Such principles have become the basis of positive
obligations upon States. Moreover, many of the provisions in the
Convention have crystallized into customary international law. In
this regard, the Convention transcends its apparent limitations and
continues to influence the contours of law in this area.
52. See LEVIE supra note 6, at 51.
53. This is a fundamental international law principle and is reflected in the Geneva
Protocol I, art. 35.
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III. THE APPLICATION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION TO
CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT
The Hague Convention was negotiated in accordance with the
prevailing law, which applied at the turn of the century to regulate
the jus ad bellum.54 At that time, the law made a sharp distinction
between the "law of war" and the "law of peace." Accordingly,
military actions that were not permissible due to a prevailing
peace, could be rendered lawful by a declaration of war.55 This is
an extremely efficient, if not morally acceptable, appraisal of
international relations. The Hague Convention recognized that
these belligerent rights accrued as a result of actually declaring a
state-of-war. Indeed, the continued deployment of naval mines
and failure to recover existing mines outside of this legal state-of-
war appears to be manifestly unlawful.
The emergence, however, of the increasing legal proscription
of war, first through the League of Nations Covenant 56 and the
Pact of Paris,57 and then through the United Nations Charter
system, 58 calls into question the continued validity of rights and
obligations owed under the Hague Convention. 59  One
interpretation of this contemporary legal state is to determine that
"belligerent rights," as such, have fallen into desuetude; thus, there
is no continuing validity to the Hague Convention's content. The
other, more attractive view, acknowledges that the Hague
Convention's substantive content continues to apply, but only to
the extent that such content is consistent with the contemporary
jus ad bellum (particularly in relation to the criteria of necessity
and proportionality) and otherwise conforms to the current
general principles relating to the jus in bello.6° This view avoids a
54. See ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE USE OF FORCE 16-17 (1993).
55. See Christopher Greenwood, The Concept of War in Modern International Law,
36 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 283, 284 (1987).
56. See generally LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT arts. 10-16; see also Greenwood,
supra note 55, at 284 n.8 (and accompanying text).
57. See generally Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of
National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, art. 1, 94 L.N.T.S. 57, see also Greenwood, supra note 55,
at 284 n.8 (and accompanying text).
58. See generally U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
59. See Natalino Ronzitti, The Right of Self-Defense and the Law of Naval Warfare, 14
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 571, 571-572 (1988).
60. See Clingan, supra note 1, at 352.
[Vol. 21:553
Legal Aspects of Naval Mine Warfare
legal vacuum and must therefore be preferred. Indeed, as late as
the 1970s, countries were still succeeding to the Hague
Convention.61 Such actions indicate a recognition that the Hague
Convention continues to have de jure significance. It is evident
that State practice and judicial comment concerning the Hague
Convention have accepted the Convention's continued vitality.
The Hague Convention, however, now applies in a modified form,
and is very much subject to additional constraints imposed by the
jus ad bellum.
A. The Jus ad Bellum and its Effect on the Hague Convention
Contemporary regulation of the right to resort to force is
contained within the United Nations Charter and supporting
international customary law. The cardinal principle relating to this
issue is reflected in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter,
62
which states that "[a]ll members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."
63
This provision is, however, subject to exception, namely, the
right of national self-defense, as set forth in Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security .... 64
B. Self-Defense and the Law of Naval Warfare
The contours of the right of national self-defense have been
judicially considered by the ICJ in Nicaragua65 and the Court has
determined that application of force under the aegis of national
self-defense must, under customary international law, be
61. See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 7, at 90.
62. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
63. Id.
64. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
65. Military and Parliamentary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), June 27, 1986, 25 I.L.M.
1023 [hereinafter Nicaragua (merits)].
1999]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
conditioned on the principles of necessity and proportionality. 66
These elements of the equation found their first expression in the
celebrated 1842 Caroline exchange between Lord Asburton of the
United Kingdom and Daniel Webster of the United States.67 The
debate determined that self-defense could be legally justified only
in certain exacting circumstances. 68 Daniel Webster enunciated
the time-honored test that required Britain to demonstrate:
a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means and no moment for deliberation. It will be for
[Britain] to show, also, that the local authorities of Canada,
even supposing the necessity of the moment authorized them to
enter the territories of the United States at all, did nothing
unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the
necessity of self-defense, must be limited by that necessity and
kept clearly within it.
6 9
"The significance of the Caroline Formulation cannot be
overstated. . . . [T]his formulation and its acceptance by the
British authorities turned the concept of self-defense from a
political excuse into a legal doctrine."
70
It is within these criteria of necessity and proportionality that
the traditional laws of naval warfare still apply.71 Hence, classic
rules relating to the laying of naval mines, as outlined in the Hague
Convention, must be justified not only in accordance with their
tenor within the Convention but also in accordance with principles
of necessity and proportionality. Author Christopher Greenwood
endorses the views of commentators, such as Judge Ago, in
concluding that the requirements of necessity and proportionality
are satisfied only if a State "is unable to achieve the desired result
by different conduct involving either no use of armed force at all
66. See generally id. at para. 249.
67. See 30 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS (1841-1842) 1138 (1858).
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. Dale Stephens, Rules of Engagement and the Concept of Unit Self Defense, 45
NAVAL L. REV. 126, 134 (1998); see also R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases,
32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 92 (1938).
71. See generally Christopher Greenwood, The Effects of the United Nations Charter
on the Law of Naval Warfare (1991) (unpublished report, on file with author and the
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal).
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or merely its use on a lesser scale." 72 Hence, rights recognized
under the Hague Convention apply only in a graduated manner,
depending on the specific circumstances. What is axiomatic,
however, is the continuing application of the principle of
distinction and the correlative obligation of notification, which are
expressly contained in the operative provisions of the Hague
Convention. The principle of distinction remains inviolable not
only in terms of its own authority, as reflected in the Convention,
but also as a result of the general principle of the law of armed
conflict as it applies to naval warfare.
Translating the classic rights that exist within a state-of-war
into a general formula of "self-defense" is a challenging exercise.
Notwithstanding, at least British State practice has been consistent
with this approach. The boarding of the British-registered Barber
Perseus merchantman in 1986 by Iranian forces during the Iran-
Iraq War was acknowledged by Britain as consistent with the right
of "self-defense." 73 The content of this somewhat amorphous
right of "self-defense" was found in the classic rules of "visit and
search."' 74 These rules, according to British statements, applied
not according to their own force, but rather, as a manifestation of
the right of self-defense as applicable in this particular context. In
this regard, classic rules are applied to "flesh out" the very general
principles of self-defense.
75
C. Proportionality
The application of the principle of proportionality, to
determine the legitimacy of actions undertaken in accordance with
classic prescriptions of the jus in bello, contains a certain elegance
and efficacy. Thus, in the context of naval mine warfare, States
avail themselves of the "right" to lay mines, but such actions must
be strategically proportionate in terms of the right of self-defense.
As a general proposition, the application of force applied by a
State runs on a continuum between mere law enforcement actions
(i.e., against illegal fishing) through dedicated armed conflict. The
72. Id. at 17.
73. See Vaughan Lowe, The Impact of the Law of the Sea on Naval Warfare, 14
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 657, 679 (1988).
74. See COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 7-6.
75. Greenwood, supra note 72, at 47.
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degree of force and the nature of rights attracted under
international law depend on where the authority for the action lies
on the legal continuum. Greenwood maintains that the meaning
of the proportionality requirement is that "the use of force must be
proportionate to the purpose for which force is used in self-
defence." 76 This allows a State sufficient justification to use that
amount of force that is reasonably necessary to achieve its
legitimate lawful objectives.77 Accepting this paradigm, this rule
applies not only to the application of force in "self-defense," but
also to any other use of force legally justified.
Similarly, although the ICJ in Nicaragua maintained that
force is justified for self-defense, it also allowed a State to resort to
"proportionate countermeasures" in circumstances where the
relevant gravity of "attack," or other use of force by an antagonist,
was not sufficient to justify actions in self-defense. 78  While
undoubtedly controversial, the notion that "proportionate
countermeasures" can "themselves include an element of force"
has been maintained by some commentators. 79 Indeed, this may
be the better view of the Court's interpretation in Nicaragua.
Accordingly, a State should be able to resort to force to give effect
to such "countermeasures" and, in that regard, Greenwood's
conception of proportionality would be equally applicable.80 In
the circumstances of unlawful mine-laying activity, which
fundamentally violates rights of international maritime freedom
and threatens peaceful shipping, proportionate countermeasures
would surely be permissible. It is, however, the nature and quality
of such proportionate countermeasures that would undoubtedly be
contentious.
This criterion of proportionality, for example, was reflected in
the actions of U.S. forces during the Vietnam conflict. The
question of whether naval mines could be legitimately deployed
against North Vietnamese ports was first considered in 1968. Such
76. Id. at 15.
77. See id. at 16.
78. See Nicaragua (merits), June 27, 1986, 25 I.L.M. at 1023, para. 249.
79. John Lawrence Hargrove, The Nicaragua Judgement and the Future of the Law of
Force and Self-Defense, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 135, 138 (1987) (noting that, although the ICJ
strongly suggested this notion, the Court ultimately found it unnecessary to decide the
issue).
80. See Greenwood, supra note 72, at 47.
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actions were not taken on the legal ground that the United States
was not engaged in armed conflict with North Vietnam.
81
Notwithstanding, four years later, U.S. military actions had
sufficiently intensified against North Vietnam, and as a result, a
decision was taken to comprehensively mine selected ports. Once
the strategic decision was made, United States actions complied
closely with the terms of the Hague Convention in providing three
days notice before the arming of mines that were moored and not
placed in international shipping lanes.82 In such circumstances,
these actions were generally endorsed by the international
community, 83 notwithstanding that sea-borne trade with North
Vietnam was almost completely curtailed. This is a relevant
example of the changing nature of proportionality. Military
options that are available to a State, including in this instance, the
use of naval mines, will be conditioned upon an assessment of the
proportionate quality of the action. In this regard, the applicable
provisions of the Hague Convention on naval mines would apply
most completely when a State is engaged in significant armed
conflict with an adversary. In such circumstances, old-style
"belligerent rights" may be exercised to their fullest extent. This is
relevant not only in relation to the rights vis-a-vis the two
antagonists, but also with respect to the belligerents' capacity to
affect third parties by restricting fights of international navigation.
This balance between freedom of navigation and self-
defensive measures has long been a ubiquitous feature of the law
of naval mine warfare. 84 Judicial comment by the ICJ in Corfu
Channel85 and Nicaragua,86 generally favors freedom of navigation
rights in circumstances that fall short of armed conflict. As a
corollary, however, it is evident that even freedom of navigation
fights may be supplanted in certain circumstances where the use of
naval mines is considered essential for State security.
81. See Clingan, supra note 1, at 357 (determination by the Director of the
International Law Division, U.S. Navy Office of the Judge Advocate General).
82. See Frank B. Swayze, Traditional Principles of Blockade in Modern Practice:
United States Mining of Internal and Territorial Waters of North Vietnam, 29 JAG J. 143,
148 (1977).
83. See Clingan, supra note 1, at 357-358.
84. Seeid. at351.
85. See Corfu Channel, 1949 I.CJ. 4 (Dec. 5).
86. See Nicaragua (merits), June 27, 1986, 25 I.L.M. at 1023.
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D. Corfu Channel
The ICJ's decision in Corfu Channel remains the seminal
decision where the legal issues surrounding the deployment of
naval mines was judicially reviewed. The Court made some
extremely insightful observations that reflect the legitimacy of the
deployment of naval mines in peacetime. Hence, a close
examination of the issues of that case is warranted.
Corfu Channel involved an assessment of a number of transits
undertaken by British warships in 1946 through the Corfu Channel
(which runs along the coast of Albania and Greece). Against a
background of some hostility, in 1946, Albanian shore batteries
fired upon two passing British warships. As a result of these
attacks, subsequent naval orders were issued directing that a battle
group (comprised of four British warships) traverse the channel.
In October 1946, these vessels were deployed in battle readiness,
and in the course of the transit, two of the warships (H.M.S.
Saumarez and H.M.S. Volage) struck mines, resulting in the death
of a number of British sailors. The mines were of a German
design and were ostensibly laid by persons unknown. The Court
did, however, attribute knowledge of these mines to Albania.87 A
more sizeable British task force was dispatched a third time to
transit the channel in accordance with "Operation Retail," which
took place November 13, 1946.88 The specific purpose of this third
and final transit was to sweep the channel for mines, so as to
gather evidence of Albanian malfeasance. 89 The mines that were
used in the Corfu Channel were moored contact mines. Without
direct evidence linking Albania to the deployment of such mines,
the Court still concluded that the laying of the minefield "could
not have been accomplished without the knowledge of the
Albanian Government." 90 Then, in a remarkable statement, the
Court found that Albania owed obligations to notify all ships in
the channel about the presence of these mines and that Albania
failed to meet such obligations in that:
Such obligations are based, not on the Hague Convention of
1907, No. VIII, which is applicable in time of war, but on certain
87. See Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 22.
88. See id. at 32-33.
89. See id. at 34.
90. Id. at 22.
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general and well recognized principles, namely: elementary
considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than
in war; the principle of the freedom of maritime
communication; and every state's obligation not to allow
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights
of other states.
91
The significance of this prescription cannot be
underestimated. The Court was prepared to find the existence of
an obligation based on "elementary considerations of humanity,"
notwithstanding that the Hague Convention did not have de jure
application to the matter at hand.92 As stated in Nicaragua, the
Court in Corfu Channel regarded these "elementary
considerations" as the principle that sustained the Hague
Convention.93 The Court refrained from elaborating on what the
"elementary considerations of humanity" actually were, but the
language seems to reflect something of the "right to life" notion
that is now reflected in Article 6 of the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights.94 If this was the tendency of the Court
in Corfu Channel, it was formally expressed in the subsequent
Nuclear Weapons decision that the right to life, in particular,
applied in armed conflict 95 (although qualified by the priority of
international humanitarian law), and a fortiori, that such a right
should apply in situations of non-armed conflict as well.
Equally significant is the Court's recognition of a right of
"freedom of maritime communications." 96 In Corfu Channel, the
Court recognized a right of non-suspensible innocent passage
through the strait.97 This right received preference over any right
that Albania had to assert its sovereignty to deny passage through
the strait. Given such an attitude, it is interesting that the Court
91. Id.
92. See id, at 22.
93. See Nicaragua (merits), June 27, 1986, 25 I.L.M. at 1023, para. 215.
94. U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
95. See generally Louise Doswald-Beck, International Humanitarian Law and the
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons, ICRC INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS No. 316, at 35-
55, (Jan. 1, 1997) (available at the ICRC website (visited Aug. 5, 1999)
<http://www.icrc.org/icreeng.nsf>).
96. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 22 (Dec. 5).
97. Id. at 55.
1999]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
condemned the third British transit, which swept the strait for
mines during "Operation Retail." If the right of freedom of
maritime communication had any substance, then such self-help
actions were surely justified. Nevertheless, the Court held that
such actions were not justified, and indeed, concluded that the
third transit constituted an unlawful intervention of Albanian
sovereignty. 98 Such a determination is all the more surprising
given the Court's attitude to the robust transit of the British task
force during the second transit, where the Court held that even in
such circumstances, the British task force was "affirming a right
which had been unjustly denied." 99
With respect to the third transit, the ICJ's reasoning is not
compelling. Commentators, such as Ian Brownlie, note that the
Court's attitude regarding the third transit is inconsistent with the
reasoning it employed when interpreting the second transit.1°°
Arguably, the Court's attitude toward the third transit was
heavily influenced by the British pleadings in Corfu Channel.
There, the British Government seemed to concede that mine-
sweeping activities did constitute an intervention, but were
excusable in these particular circumstances. 10 1  Given such a
submission, it is not altogether surprising that the Court refrained
from establishing a new exception to the principle of non-
intervention. The point received a degree of clarification some
forty years later, in the ICJ's Nicaragua decision, which in effect,
"overruled" this aspect of the Corfu Channel decision.
E. Nicaragua
10 2
The facts of Nicaragua involve the U.S. Government's
support of the "Contra Rebels" in the early 1980s. The case also
concerned counter-allegations by the U.S. Government regarding
98. See id. at 35.
99. Id. at 30.
100. See generally IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE
BY STATES 287 (1963).
101. See Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 33-35.
102. For a general discussion of Nicaragua in the context of military and maritime
affairs see, Dale Stephens, Rules of Engagement and the Concept of Unit Self Defense, 45
NAVAL L. REV. 126 (1998); Dale Stephens, The Impact of the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention on the Conduct of Peacetime Naval/Military Operations, 29 CAL. W. INT'L LJ.
283 (1999).
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the Nicaraguan Government support of rebel elements in
neighboring Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica during this
same time period. In addition to these general questions
concerning the support of military activities, the Court specifically
determined that the United States was responsible for the mining
of Nicaraguan ports, which had been covertly undertaken by
United States agents and without notification or warning to the
international shipping community. 103
The Court condemned the mining and determined, again, that
such actions violated international humanitarian principles. 104 In
particular, the Court referred to the provisions of Articles 3 and 4
of the Hague Convention and opined that the requirement to
provide notification to peaceful shipping was paramount to
determining the legitimacy of mining actions.10 5  The Court
couched its opinion expressly in terms of international
humanitarian law "underlying the specific provisions of
Convention VIII of 1907 ",106 and subsequently cited, with
approval, the relevant passage from Corfu Channel quoted
above.' 0 7 Importantly, on this point, even the dissenting Judge
Schwebel found a rare consensus with the majority
determination. 108
The views of the Court on the lawfulness of the mine-laying
activities, however, are somewhat ambiguous. The majority
opinion generally held that the laying of mines by one State in
another State's internal waters or territorial sea in peacetime is an
"unlawful act." 10 9  While this is undoubtedly true, it begs the
question as to what constitutes "peacetime." Judge Schwebel, in
his dissent, seems to accept that United States actions in the case
were premised on the right of self-defense and therefore, justified
the "blockade-like measures" (i.e., laying mines), although he
points out that the failure to provide notice affected the legitimacy
103. See Clingan supra note 1, at 358.
104. See Nicaragua (merits), June 27, 1986, 25 I.L.M. at 1023, para. 215.
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. For the relevant passage from Corfu Channel, see supra note 91 and
accompanying text.
108. See Military and Parliamentary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), June 27, 1986, 25 I.L.M.
1146, paras. 238-239 (Schwebel, J., dissenting) [hereinafter Nicaragua (Schwebel dissent)].
109. Nicaragua (merits), June 27, 1986,25 I.L.M. at 1023, para. 215.
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of the United States' actions. 110
The significance of Corfu Channel and Nicaragua lie in their
identification of the principle underpinning the Hague
Convention. The ICJ cites "elementary considerations of
humanity" as the substantive basis for its imposition of obligations
on the mine-laying (or tolerating) States."' Such considerations
are not actually elaborated in the cases, but do seem to reflect the
principle of distinction and the principles of human rights law.
The requirement of notice remains critical in this legal legitimacy
equation and must be satisfied before any assessment of mine-
laying under the principles of self-defense can be contemplated.
F. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and Proportionate
Countermeasures
Given the capacity of the ICJ to identify active obligations
deriving from the principles underpinning the Hague Convention,
it is unfortunate that the Court, in each of the above two instances,
did not fully determine the rights that affected States to counter
unlawful mine-laying activity.
In Nicaragua, the Court recognized that when one State
violates general maritime freedoms, another State may embark on
"proportionate countermeasures" to redress the violation.11 2 The
concept of proportionate countermeasures was, unfortunately, not
comprehensively defined by the Court. What is significant about
the Court's reasoning, however, is that it provides States with an
opportunity to utilize proportionate countermeasures in a number
of circumstances where an "armed attack," as defined under
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,11 3 is not necessarily
established. Hence, the Court seemed to indicate that an element
of force could accompany such countermeasures.
The Court recognized that proportionate countermeasures
could be utilized to ensure freedom of "maritime communications
and maritime commerce." 114 This conclusion was based on the
110. See Nicaragua (Schwebel dissent), 25 I.L.M. at 1146, para. 238.
111. Nicaragua (merits), June 27, 1986,25 I.L.M. at 1023, para. 215.
112. See generally id. at para. 214; see also generally R. St. J. McDonald, The Nicaragua
Case: New Answers to Old Questions, 24 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 127, 136 (1986).
113. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
114. Nicaragua (merits), 25 I.L.M. at 1023, para. 214.
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Court's reading of the COLS,115 particularly in the context of naval
mines blocking international sea lanes, 116 and its enunciation of
the principle that, under the COLS, "a State which enjoys a right
of access to ports for its ships also enjoys all the freedom necessary
for maritime navigation.""
n 7
Arguably, minesweeping activities in international
straits/archipelagic sea lanes or upon international waters are
permissible. As for territorial waters, in the absence of a
suspension of innocent passage, pursuant to Article 25 of the
COLS, consistent with the reasoning of the Court as to the rights
of freedom of maritime commerce, and in conjunction with the
right to undertake proportionate countermeasures, arguably,
minesweeping of mines already placed within such waters must be
permissible. More problematic is the question of the use of force
employed to counter unlawful mine-laying activity. State practice,
as evidenced by U.S. actions in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-
Iraq War, however, illustrate U.S. attitudes concerning the
legitimacy of force in such circumstances.
The United States' actions during the Iran-Iraq Tanker War
seem to support the proposition that force may be employed in
circumstances where the Hague Convention, or the principles
underpinning the Convention, are violated. In the course of the
Tanker War, the United States contended that Iran was, most
likely, responsible for the deployment of large numbers of
unanchored contact mines in the Persian Gulf.118 Such drifting
mines caused considerable damage to neutral shipping, including
commercial ships flying under the U.S. flag. As a result of such
activities, United States Army helicopters, in September 1987,
identified an Iranian vessel (the Iran Ajr) laying mines in
international shipping lanes." 9 The Iranian vessel was strafed and
captured; the United States Government justified its actions as
115. See id. at paras. 212, 214 (reference to the Convention on the Law of the Sea, art.
18, para. 1(b)).
116. See Nicaragua (merits), 25 I.L.M. at 1023, para. 214.
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. See Myron H. Nordquist & Margaret G. Wachenfeld, Legal Aspects of Reflagging
Kuwaiti Tankers and Laying of Mines in the Persian Gulf, 31 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 138,
161 (1988).
119. See David L. Peace, Major Maritime Events in the Persian Gulf Between 1984 and
1991: A Juridical Analysis, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 545, 555 (1991).
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national self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 120
Significantly, U.S. actions were further justified as consistent with
obligations to ensure "world public order and the safety of
international maritime commerce."' 121 This justification partially
echoes the notion of universal jurisdiction crimes and parallels the
ICJ's reasoning in Corfu Channel and Nicaragua. While the
deployment of unanchored mines is probably not yet a crime of
universal jurisdiction, the language that the ICJ used in Corfu
Channel, and more particularly, in Nicaragua, defining such
actions as violations of "elementary considerations of humanity,"
certainly has that character.
Subsequent actions by Iranian forces in the (alleged)
continued mine-laying operations and specific missile attacks on
tankers led to the United States' forceful response by way of its
attack on Iran's Resalat and Rashadat platforms in the central
Persian Gulf.122 The justification for these attacks was national
self-defense. The United States maintained that the platforms
were used as a base for Iranian mining activities and other attacks.
United States forces made subsequent attacks on oil platforms in
the Salman oil field located within the Iranian exclusive economic
zone and continental shelf maritime zone.12 a Now subject to
pending judicial determination by the ICJ, the Oil Platforms
decision promises to provide valuable judicial analysis of the
content of the right of self-defense, particularly in relation to the
issue of unlawfully sowing naval mines within international
shipping routes.
G. Summary
There are compelling arguments in favor of recognizing the
application of the Hague Convention provisions to contemporary
naval mine warfare practices. Notwithstanding the legal abolition
of the state-of-war, the emergence of the right of "self-defense,"
pursuant to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and supporting
120. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
121. Nordquist & Wachenfeld, supra note 118, at 161 (citing Caught in the Act, TIME,
Oct., 1987, at 22-24).
122. See Oil Platforms, (Iran v. U.S.), 1996 I.C.J. 803 (Dec. 12).
123. See id. at 807 (the U.S. attacked the oil platforms on October 19, 1987 and April
18, 1988).
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customary international law, necessitates the application of the
rules of the jus in bello to continuing armed conflict.
Both State practice and judicial opinion are vigilant in
observing and subsequently criticizing the deployment of naval
mines in situations that constitute less than "armed conflicts."
This is premised on recognition of the rights to navigational
freedom, which have gained considerable legal ascendancy this
century, as well as the acknowledgment of elementary
considerations, of humanity as highlighted in Corfu Channel and
Nicaragua. Such elementary considerations appear to derive their
authority from human rights obligations and reflect one of the
most fundamental principles of the jus in bello, namely, the
principle of distinction.
A mine-laying State may partially overcome these objections
by providing sufficient notification of the existence of a minefield.
Given the nature of this weapons system, it is not surprising that
notification has this somewhat palliative quality. On the whole,
naval mines are passive weapons that wait for an enemy to
approach. Technological developments aside, the majority of
naval mines are still incapable of distinguishing between legitimate
targets and protected entities. In such circumstances, the provision
of notice and warning can be seen as a fundamental requirement
to ensure that the principle of distinction is observed.
In the absence of such notice, particularly in circumstances
where rights of self-defense (or other legal justification) cannot be
established, international opinion and judicial assessment are
quick to condemn such mine-laying activity. The ICJ's
determination in Nicaragua, that proportionate countermeasures
are available to a State to ensure freedom of navigational rights,
allows for mine-sweeping activities in such circumstances.
Whether the application of extended force in attacking the mine-
laying State qualifies as a legitimate proportionate countermeasure
is more problematic. Certainly, forceful United States Navy
actions during the Iran-Iraq War were justified under Article 51,
but they actions also reflected the "crimes of humanity" character
of the mine-laying actions. Whether proportionate
countermeasures can be invoked to justify such forceful actions or
whether reliance needs to be included in Article 51 (in terms of
national or collective self-defense), there seems to persuasive logic
supporting such actions, at least in circumstances where the
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elementary considerations of humanity that underpin the Hague
Convention, are wantonly violated.
IV. RULES OF CUSTOMARY LAW
The law relating to naval mine warfare has a particularly rich
pedigree. The challenge in planning contemporary naval
operations, is to translate the relevant provisions of the Hague
Convention and related judicial assessments into workable and
meaningful rules. Customary international law applies to "fill
gaps" and provide a reliable basis for such planning. Until
recently, it was difficult to properly discern the nature of
applicable customary rules, especially because no authoritative
statement or analysis had been undertaken on the customary law
of naval warfare since World War 1.124 As a result of this
conundrum, in June 1994, a group of legal scholars and naval
"operators" compiled a manual on the law of naval warfare. 125
Known generally as the San Remo Manual, this compilation
contains some very incisive conclusions on the state of the law
relating to naval mine warfare and its commentary is a useful guide
in identifying relevant principles from disparate sources. 126
Naturally enough, the San Remo Manual's provisions dealing with
naval mine warfare draw heavily on the Hague Convention and
combine the Convention's provisions with conclusions based on
observations of specific State practice and associated opinio juris
and more general principles, such as those found in the Geneva
Protocols.1 27 Given this authority, the final part of this Article
reviews and analyzes the San Remo Manual's rules regarding
customary international law, as they apply to contemporary naval
mine warfare.
124. See generally OXFORD MANUAL OF THE LAWS OF NAVAL WAR (1913) available
at (visited Aug. 4, 1999) <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/1913a.htm> (constituting
the most authoritative source of customary international law at the time).
125. See generally SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 10.
126. See generally id.
127. See, e.g., Geneva Protocol I.
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A. Mines May Only be Used for Legitimate Military Purposes,
Including the Denial of an Enemy's Access to Sea Areas1 28
This first rule highlights the principle of distinction as it is
understood under contemporary prescriptions. The use of the
term "military purposes" paraphrases the general reference in
Article 48 of the Geneva Protocol 1129 to those "objectives" that
may be made the subject of an attack.130 Within contemporary
naval mine warfare, this rule encompasses a considerable number
of vessels. Vessels that are considered legitimate "objectives" are,
inter alia, enemy warships and their auxiliaries, enemy merchant
ships that engage in belligerent acts or otherwise effectively
contribute to military action, and neutral merchant ships engaging
in activities that support enemy military action.
Additionally, this rule anticipates no geographic limitation on
the sowing of mines.131  Indeed, the San Remo Manual's
commentary on this rule identifies the military planning doctrine,
which allows the use of a defensive minefield (used to deny access-
to the territory of a belligerent), a protective minefield (used to
protect shipping routes, thus denying enemy submarines or surface
craft the use of certain waterways outside coastal waters), or an
offensive minefield (mining waters under the enemy's control). 132
An express right to sow mines within international waters is a
"progressive" step in the interpretation of the international law.
Notwithstanding this, a number of subsequent rules substantially
qualify this general proposition by referring to obligations to
respect navigational rights. 133  In fact, these subsequent rules
impose positive obligations on mine-laying States to protect
"peaceful shipping." These obligations extend beyond the
provision of simple notification and serve to severely circumscribe
the right to lay mines in international waters.
Finally, this rule's express recognition the role of naval mines
in denying access to sea areas supersedes the provision in Article 3
of the Hague Convention, which would require mines to be
128. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 10, at 169.
129. See Geneva Protocol I, art 48, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
130. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 10, at 169.
131. See Geneva Protocol I, art 49, para. 2, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
132. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 10, at 169-170.
133. See, e.g., infra Parts IV.F-J.
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rendered "harmless within a limited time." 134 Imposing such a
legal obligation, as does the Hague Convention, severely
undermines the significant strategic role that mine fields play in
contemporary naval warfare; thus, the provision's "repeal," within
this customary rule, necessarily reflects strategic realities. Indeed,
in this regard, the declaration of a false minefield is not considered
perfidious conduct, provided that the safety of peaceful shipping is
not subsequently jeopardized.
135
B. Parties to a Conflict Shall Not Lay Mines Unless Effective
Neutralization Occurs When the Mines Become Detached or
Control Over Them is Otherwise Lost
136
This rule closely resembles the terms of Article 1 of the
Hague Convention, 137 and again, is directed towards ensuring
respect for the principle of distinction. The San Remo Manual's
commentary highlights the expansive reach of the substantive
obligations of customary law concerning monitoring mines in
circumstances where control over such mines is otherwise lost.
138
This rule applies, not only to drifting mines, but also to other
mines, such as bottom-dwelling mines that have been left
unattended for significant periods of time.139  This rule is
compelling because, in addition to the notice obligation, it imposes
an obligation to constantly monitor naval mines. The imposition
of such an obligation echoes the ICJ's decision in Corfu Channel,
which attributed knowledge, and therefore international
responsibility, to Albania 140 despite the lack of any direct evidence
linking the presence of mines in the Corfu Channel to Albanian
malfeasance.
134. Hague Convention VIII, art. 3.
135. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 10, at 169-170.
136. See id. at 171.
137. See Hague Convention VIII, art. 1.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See Corfu Channel, 1949 I.CJ. 4 at 22 (Dec. 5).
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C. It is Forbidden to Use Free-Floating Mines Unless They are
Directed Against a Military Objective and the Mines Become
Harmless Within an Hour After Control Over Them is Lost
141
This rule, in many respects, reiterates the distinction
emphasized in the two above-referenced customary rules.'
42
Interestingly, per the San Remo Manual commentary, free-floating
mines may have a degree of military utility.143 The commentary
anticipates that such mines might be deployed as a matter of
tactical necessity in circumstances where such mines could be
dropped to foil the immediate pursuit of opposing hostile forces.
144
There is a fundamental inconsistency with this proposition. A
free-floating mine represents one of the more self-evident
violations of the principle of distinction. The San Remo Manual
commentary, in accepting the "military necessity" of such an act,
necessarily concludes that any "collateral" damage that occurs,
even to protected vessels, is acceptable; 145 this reasoning is not
supportable. While the rights of naval/military forces to defend
themselves under the aegis of unit self-defense are established,
146
such actions do not justify violating the most fundamental
principles of the jus in bello. In this regard, however, it is pertinent
to note that countries such as Australia have made declarations
upon ratification of the Geneva Protocol I, stipulating that
"military advantage," as defined by Articles 51 and 57 of the
Protocol, 147 encompasses the "security of the attacking forces."'148
This could, indeed, give more weight to military necessity (in terms
of protecting members of a State's military forces) in the
proportionality equation. Even this provision, however, cannot
allow fundamental violation of the rules designed to ensure the
protected status of a particular vessel. Indeed, such proscription is
so entrenched in the law of armed conflict that even the rule's
"one-hour" caveat cannot support any apparent modification of
141. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 10, at 171.
142. See supra Parts IV.A-B.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See generally Stephens, supra note 70.
147. See Geneva Protocol I, arts. 51, 57.
148. AIR POWER STUDIES CENTRE, OPERATIONS LAW FOR RAAF COMMANDER'S
DI(AF) AAP 1003 6-7 (1994).
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the rule. Could it be any less egregious of a violation of the jus in
bello if a floating mine deployed by pursued forces struck a passing
hospital ship within the one-hour grace period than if the mine
struck the ship outside this time frame?
D. International Shipping Must be Notified of the Laying of Armed
Mines or the Arming of Pre-laid Mines Unless the Mines Can Only
Detonate Against Vessels that are Military Objectives
149
The provision for giving notice finds its first expression in this
rule. Assuming that notice procedures are met, as mandated by
the ICJ, 150 the question of correlative third-party rights arises.
What obligations are imposed on third parties when they
subsequently enter such minefields? Can such notification
principles, faithfully complied with by belligerents, undermine a
third party's freedom of maritime navigation rights? There are
occasions when such maritime rights may be supplanted by the
right of self-defense. 151  Accordingly, the mine-laying State
providing notice does not breach international obligations if a
third-party State's forces enter such a minefield, provided that the
minefield was otherwise lawfully created.
This rule is more demanding than Article 3 of the Hague
Convention, which simply requires notice only when "military
exigencies" permitted.152 The provision of "notice," which is a
general duty that applies in both peace and wartime, is reflective
of the nature of this weapons system and conforms with strategic
goals by enhancing the naval mine's role in denying sea access.
An interesting aspect of this rule concerns its application to
anti-submarine warfare. Given that are so few commercial
submarines, it is arguable that a submerged minefield, which only
operates against hostile submarine threats, is an example of a
minefield that targets only legitimate military objects, and to which
notice provisions arguably do not apply. Notwithstanding this
theoretical possibility, prudence nonetheless dictates that general
warning and notification should be provided.
149. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 10, at 172.
150. See Nicaragua (merits), June 27, 1986,25 I.L.M. at 1023, para. 215.
151. See discussion, supra Part II.
152. See Hague Convention VIII, art. 3.
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E. Belligerents Shall Record the Locations Where They Have Laid
Mines
153
This rule is a necessary consequence of the obligation to
notify the international community about the laying of armed
mines. It is also an incident of the rule requiring that States
maintain control over mines. The rule does not limit the types of
mines that must be recorded nor does it stipulate whether or not
the mines must be armed. According to the San Remo Manual's
commentary however, the rule does not require such records be
made public unless there is a danger to neutral shipping.
154
F. Mining Operations in the Internal Waters, Territorial Sea or
Archipelagic Waters of a Belligerent State Should Provide, When
Mining is First Executed, for the Free Exit of Neutral States'
Shipping155
This rule does not derive from the Hague Convention, but
rather is an implication of the general principle of distinction. The
San Remo Manual's commentary states that this rule is reflective
of international practice, as evidenced by U.S. actions in the
mining of Haiphong Harbor during the Vietnam conflict.156
This rule is interesting because of its reference to territorial
seas or archipelagic waters. Assuming that mining operations are
a justified act of national self-defense, the rule allows for the
proscription of innocent passage through territorial or archipelagic
waters. This contentious issue raises questions as to the extent to
which belligerent operations allow for the amelioration of long-
standing third-party navigational rights. As evidenced by the
mining of various Vietnamese ports during the Vietnam War, it
seems that such a proscription is acceptable. 157
153. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 10, at 172.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See Swayze, supra note 82, at 148.
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G. The Mining of Neutral Waters by a Belligerent is Prohibited
158
Article 2 of the United Nations Charter prohibits the use or
threat of force in the conduct of international relations.159 This
principle is regarded as having a status of jus cogens.
160
Interestingly, the San Remo Manual defines neutral waters as only
a State's internal waters, territorial sea, or its archipelagic
waters.161 The definition does not include archipelagic sea lanes or
those international straits that are regarded as having a legal
character that is sui generis162 and are thus outside the prohibition.
Beyond the prohibition in Article 2 of the U.N. Charter, it is also
arguable that laying mines within a neutral State's waters
constitutes an "armed attack" for the purposes of Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter.163 Additionally, such actions may constitute a
"blockade" (depending on the circumstances) under Article 3(c)
of the 1974 General Assembly Resolution on the Definition of
Aggression 164 and therefore may be deemed "acts of aggression."
Given the general prohibition against mining neutral waters,
it would be an escalatory step to mine another State's archipelagic
sea lanes, or straits, even though such actions would appear lawful.
The conduct of belligerent vessels or aircraft laying such mines
would not be consistent with transit (or archipelagic sea lanes)
passage, which, pursuant to Article 39 of the COLS, mandates that
transiting vessels (or aircraft) undertaking transit passage will
"refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of States bordering
the strait .... ,,165 Mining these waters may have strategic value.
158. See SAN REMO MANUAL supra note 10, at 173.
159. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
160. See Nicaragua (merits), June 27, 1986, 25 I.L.M. at 1023, para. 190. The term, "jus
cogens," means a "mandatory norm of general international law from which no two or
more nations may exempt themselves or release one another." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 356 (Pocket ed. 1996).
161. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 10, at 172.
162. The term, "sui generis," means "[olf its own kind or class; i.e., the only one of its
own kind; peculiar." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 1286 (emphasis
retained from original).
163. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
164. See G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR 29th Sess., Annex 7.5, art. 3(c) (the definition
of "aggression" includes "the blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed
forces of another State ....").
165. Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 39, para. 1(b).
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However, there is a substantial likelihood that this mining will
escalate tensions and incur additional duties to ensure the safety of
neutral shipping, which is likely to outweigh the military utility of
such an operation.
H. Mining Shall Not Have the Practical Effect of Preventing
Passage between Neutral Waters and International Waters
166
While this rule is a necessary consequence of the
aforementioned rule, it is nevertheless significant because of its
reference to international waters. It reflects the law's continuing
ambiguity with respect to the legitimacy of mining international
waters. Again, this rule does not establish a general prohibition,
but nevertheless regulates such actions to ensure freedom of
navigation rights.
L Mine-laying States Shall Pay Due Regard to the Legitimate Uses
of the High Seas by Providing Safe Alternate Routes for Neutral
States' Shipping167
This rule specifically allows for the maintenance of traditional
high seas' freedoms and provides yet another qualification on the
right to lay mines in international waters. This rule is significant in
that it does not require the provision of safe alternate routes of
"similar convenience," which is the terminology used in the
COLS.168 This omission suggests that such safe alternate routes
need not take into account commercial or navigational priorities,
and hence, allows a belligerent considerable leeway in complying
with this general rule. The San Remo Manual's commentary
suggests that these obligations arise when safe transit is at issue. 169
Thus, providing alternate routes is not the only method of
complying with this rule.170 For example, escorting neutral vessels
through a minefield, rather than providing alternate routes, would
be another method of compliance. 171 Use of such a method is,
however, undoubtedly subject to the tactical and geographical
166. See SAN REMO MANUAL supra note 10, at 173.
167. See id.
168. See, e.g., Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 53, para. 4, art. 38, para. 1.
169. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 10, at 173.
170. See id
171. See id.
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realities impacting the military utility of such an undertaking.
J. Transit Passage Through International Straits and Passage
Through Waters Subject to the Right of Archipelagic Sea Lanes
Passage Shall Not Be Impeded Unless Safe and Convenient
Alternate Routes are Provided
172
This rule reflects the current legal status of international
straits and archipelagic sea lanes, as established in the COLS. 173
Accordingly, rights of transit passage and archipelagic sea lane
passage to third parties cannot be suspended under any
circumstances. It is curious, however, that although the San Remo
Manual's commentary on the rule recognizes the new legal status
of these waterways, it nevertheless concludes that it is not
unlawful, per se, to lay mines in these areas.174 Such actions
impose extremely high, ongoing obligations on mine-laying States
to ensure safe and convenient alternate routes. Pursuant to the jus
in bello, such actions must be specifically justified by the
proportionality principles.
K. Neutral States do Not Act Inconsistent with the Laws of
Neutrality by Clearing Mines Laid in Violation of International
Law175
This rule is significant because it recognizes the correlative
"self-help" rights to ensure that the jus in bello retains its integrity.
This rule conflicts with the ICJ's assessment of the rights available
during the third-party transit in Corfu Channel.176 This rule,
however, is reflective of the Court's subsequent tacit recognition in
Nicaragua, of the right to undertake proportionate
countermeasures to remove unlawfully-laid mines. 177  In this
regard, Nicaragua is preferred over Corfu Channel; mine-sweeping
may undoubtedly be undertaken when the elements of necessity
and proportionality are established.
172. See id. at 74.
173. See generally Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 53.
174. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 10, at 174.
175. See id. at 176.
176. See discussion, supra Part III.D.
177. See Nicaragua (merits), June 27, 1986, 25 I.L.M. at 1023, para. 249.
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L. Remaining Rules
The remaining rules in the San Remo Manual178 relate to the
obligations to remove naval mines or render them harmless, and to
share technical information relevant to the removal of such mines
following the cessation of hostilities. These provisions reflect the
terms of Article 5 of the Hague Convention concerning the
removal of mines following the conclusion of war.179 The San
Remo Manual's rules, however, are concerned only with the
removal of mines when practically possible and, in that respect,
adopt terminology that reflects the Geneva Conventions' concern,
namely, the practical reality of ending hostilities.
180
M. Summary
The contours of the customary law of naval warfare, as
expounded in the San Remo Manual, draw heavily on the Hague
Convention's provisions. This reliance testifies to the cogency of
the provisions and recognizes the importance of the Convention's
underlying principles. Importantly, the San Remo Manual
recognizes the application of the Hague Convention to the post-
Charter environment and incorporates developments relating to
the COLS and State practice ensuring the respect for navigational
freedoms and the undertaking of self-defensive actions. Although
the San Remo Manual's rules reflect the law's ambivalent attitude
regarding the mining of international waters, the rules continue to
allow for the possibility of mine-laying action and provide a
number of qualifications to ensure the integrity of humanitarian
law principles and protect freedom of maritime commerce and
navigation. In essence, the San Remo Manual is an accurate fusion
of treaty law and judicial observations that makes a balanced
assessment of the nature of State practice.
V. CONCLUSION
As a matter of historical fact, the Hague Convention is the
principal treaty regulating the law of naval warfare today. 181 The
178. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 10, at 174-175.
179. See Hague Convention VIII, art. 5.
180. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 10, at 174.
181. See Clingan, supra note 1, at 351.
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Convention was drafted in an era where belligerent rights received
considerable deference in the legal landscape and, in this regard,
was very much an exercise of political realism. Nevertheless, the
humanitarian impulse, which was prevalent in the negotiations and
in the terms of the Convention, has become preeminent in the
modern determination of rights and obligations in this area.
Although some aspects of the Hague Convention are
undoubtedly obsolete today, judicial bodies champion the
principles underpinning the Convention and States invoke the
Convention's terms to justify their actions. Moreover, the
Convention's "humanitarian impulses" found legal expression in
the Additional Geneva Protocols of 1977.182
The law relating to naval mine warfare, as manifested in the
Hague Convention's terms and subsequently-developed customary
international law, is a body of law that possesses a particular
efficacy. As outlined in the San Remo Manual, this area of
regulation is primarily concerned with balancing rights. Such
balancing relates, generally, to the theoretical interaction of the jus
ad bellum and jus in bello, and, more specifically, to the issues of
freedom of navigation and self-defensive actions.
183
This Article emphasizes that the law of naval mine warfare is
a dynamic area of law that is in flux. States and military planners,
however, genuinely accept the cogency of the rules as thus far
developed. Indeed, the rules retain an indigenous logic and
elegant simplicity, notwithstanding the considerable theoretical
discourse on the contours of the law by the ICJ and numerous
commentators. The San Remo Manual has, undoubtedly,
facilitated consideration of the underlying principles of the law of
naval mine warfare. Perhaps the most compelling endorsement of
the San Remo Manual is the faithful incorporation of its terms in
many military manuals and military planners' ready acceptance of
its principles as "common sense;"'184 thus realizing the ambitious
aim of the San Remo Manual's drafters.
182. See generally Geneva Protocol I.
183. See supra Parts III.A-G.
184. Author's personal observation.
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